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Peirce’s Hypothesis of the Final
Opinion
A Transcendental Feature and an Empirical Constraint
Aaron B. Wilson
 
1. Empiricist and Transcendentalist Approaches to
Peirce’s Thought
1 Charles S. Peirce makes some of his strongest commitments to a form of empiricism in
the 1903 Harvard lectures, in which he argues that “all our knowledge rests on perceptual
judgments” (CP5.142/EP2:204) and that “perceptual judgments are the first premises of
all  our  reasoning”  (CP5.116/EP2:191).  I  have  argued  (Wilson  2016)  specifically  that
Peirce’s  mature  architectonic  –  or  the  strands  of  it  that  begin  to  coalesce  around
1902-1903 – is a particularly strong form of empiricism, in that it does not recognize any
of our knowledge as a priori, or as indefeasible by the judgments of sense perception or by
what can be correctly inferred therefrom. Even so-called analytic knowledge is not a
priori, on Peirce’s account, as he holds that necessary reasoning involves perception or
perception-like  states  involving  imagined  diagrams.1 An  inference  from an  imagined
diagram involves an inference from a type of perceptual judgment. Long before the 1903
Harvard lectures,  in his 1877 “The Fixation of Belief” (henceforth Fixation),  he argues
against the “a priori method” of fixing belief in both science and philosophy (W3: 254-6),
claiming that  its  essence is  “to think as  one is  inclined to think.” Peirce specifically
identifies Hegel as a proponent of the a priori method, and, in a footnote added in 1893,
he also identifies Kant as one.
2 However, as it is well known, throughout his writings Peirce expresses his thought as
having significant roots in Kantian philosophy. He also claims that his pragmaticism (as
he calls it in 1904 and later) is closely allied to Hegelian absolute idealism – a claim that I
will support in this essay.2 But whatever metaphysical ideas or elements he draws from
transcendental  idealism  or  from  absolute  idealism  are  stripped  from  any  a  priori
epistemic  foundation.  For  Peirce,  strong  empiricism is  consistent  with  knowledge  of
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metaphysical truths. As I have argued elsewhere, on his account, our sense perceptions
represent instances of each of the three categories (Firsts, Seconds, and Thirds) including
universals  (or  generals)  and modal  properties  (such as  conditional  necessities),3 so  that
through inferential and prescissive processes we can distinguish objects or structures
more general than what would fall within the purview of any special science.4 On his
account, even highly speculative metaphysical theories can be regarded as, at worst, bad
empirical  theories;  and all  the great metaphysicians of  the past,  from Parmenides to
Hegel, were really only drawing from experience, if only poorly.5
3 Contrary to Peirce, most metaphysicians have been under the impression that they have
been drawing from a source of knowledge that is epistemically closed off from sense
experience, and that their metaphysical claims are thereby safe from the revelations of
ongoing sense  experience.  Such metaphysicians  include Kant,  and such metaphysical
claims include his claims about the conditions for the possibility of empirical knowledge –
i.e., his transcendental idealism. Fully acknowledging Kant’s positive influence on Peirce,
the strong empiricist interpretation of Peirce resists the interpretation of him as a type of
transcendental philosopher, so far as transcendental philosophy assumes a priori knowledge
of the conditions for the possibility of empirical knowledge.6 It is not inconsistent with
the claim that there is something like a transcendental condition for knowledge in Peirce’s
mature philosophy. Indeed, in this paper I will explain how there is. 
4 As is well known, transcendental approaches to Peirce’s thought gained prominence with
the publication of Karl-Otto Apel’s landmark work, Charles S. Peirce: From Pragmatism to
Pragmaticism (1981). While at several places Apel acknowledges Peirce’s movements away
from and disagreements with Kant, especially during the final period of Peirce’s thought
(starting  around  1898),  Apel  nonetheless  argues  that  Peirce  made  a  “semiotic
transformation of Kantianism” (Appel, 1981: 191) that replaces the transcendental subject
with an indefinite  community of  inquirers  (ibid.:  193),  and replaces  a  transcendental
foundation  for  judgments  of  experience  with  a  transcendental  foundation  for  “the
validity of the process of induction in the long run” (ibid.: 164-5). In Apel’s view, Peirce
effectively makes an a priori  argument for the validity of  induction by applying the
pragmatic  analysis  of  “real”  as that  which  is  cognizable  in  the  long  run.  In  “The
Probability of Induction” (1878), Peirce argues that “that the rule of induction will hold
good in the long run may be deduced from the principle that reality is only the object of
the final opinion to which sufficient investigation would lead” (CP2.693/ W3:305). This
certainly sounds like an a priori argument; and Apel is not alone in reading Peirce as
making an a priori argument for the validity of induction.7
5 A  systematic  transcendental  reading  of  Peirce  has  been  most  recently  defended  by
Gabriele Gava, who argues that, in Peirce, an “ideal of rationality functions as a necessary
but regulative (in Kant’s sense) condition to account for semiotic processes” (Gava, 2014:
2), and that, for Peirce, purposefulness is a “necessary regulative condition of thinking”
(ibid.). While necessary conditions do not entail transcendental conditions knowable only a
priori, Gava’s view is that, for Peirce, the purposefulness that directs semiotic processes,
the esthetic ideal – which contains the final opinion or the logical ideal – is independent of
experience in that it explains the semiotic process regardless of what experience might
ever  show.  Gava  is  careful  to  distinguish  between  transcendental  conditions  as
justificatory and as explanatory, and he argues that Peirce is only espousing the latter
sort of transcendental condition. Nonetheless, this reading holds that, for Peirce, the
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transcendental conditions for semiosis cannot fail to explain semiosis as a result of any
new experience or any new conclusion drawn logically from perceptual judgments.
6 As with other attempts to cast Peirce’s philosophy as a type of transcendental philosophy,
8 Gava’s preserves Peirce’s fallibilism. This is easy enough, since transcendental idealism,
or virtually any claim to a priori knowledge, does not entail infallibilism. For whatever a-
priori-knowledge-generating-faculties  are  postulated,  those  faculties  can  be  assumed
fallible.9 However, as is evident from “Questions Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed for
Man” (1868, henceforth Questions), Peirce is skeptical that we have any faculties other
than (a) sense experience and (b) reasoning from sense experience, including abductive
reasoning; and he seems particularly skeptical that we have the sort of faculties through
which transcendental conditions of empirical knowledge have been presumed knowable.
10
7 I argue that Peirce does identify conditions for the possibility of knowledge, but that these
conditions are not transcendental. They are empirical laws which determine that our opinions
will tend to conform more and more to reality over an indefinite course of experience and inquiry.
That is, Peirce’s hypothesis of the Final Opinion may be regarded as, what Sacks (1997)
calls, a “transcendental feature” of knowledge, which is a general condition for empirical
knowledge,  but  where  knowledge  of  that  condition  itself  depends  on  the  course  of
experience.  The  hypothesis  of  the  Final  Opinion,  along  with  other  hypotheses  that
coalesce  with  it  and  support  it,  are  ultimately  empirical  hypotheses  that  are  also
transcendental  features.  Peirce  recognizes  that  we  need  to  explain  how  experience
determines our minds to conform to reality. But he also recognizes that we can do so only
through what we learn from experience. 
8 Note, however, I will not specifically argue against other claims of transcendentalism in
Peirce, such as claims concerning his universal categories (e.g., that Peirce treats their
reality as a transcendental condition for the possibility of knowledge).11
9 While Peirce is engaged in a sort of “critique,” in the Kantian sense of an examination of
the general conditions for and limitations of knowledge, I  am unsure whether or not
empiricists such as Locke, Hume, and Reid could also count as “critical philosophers” in
that sense, since they too identified general conditions for and limitations on knowledge.
Locke’s empiricist doctrine (that all our knowledge is built up from simple ideas of sense
and reflection)  and Hume’s  copy principle (that  all  ideas must  be copied from sense
impressions) are each a general condition for or limitation on knowledge. Though Peirce
emphasizes  that  his  own position on first  principles,  “critical  common-sensism,”  has
roots in Kantian critical philosophy, he regards critical common-sensism primarily as a
variation of Reid’s philosophy of common sense (CP5.439, 1905).
10 But the strong empiricist interpretation can grant that Peirce’s philosophy has significant
roots in and affinities with the idealist movement that Kant initiated. In fact, Peirce’s
philosophy may have more in common with Fichte’s,  Schelling’s,  and Hegel’s systems
than it does with Kant’s. While it seems that each (Fichte, Schelling, Hegel) sought to
establish a priori  the conditions for the possibility of empirical  knowledge,  each also
sought, as Peirce did, conditions that would not entail a ding an sich (a transcendental
object or a wholly extra-empirical realm) or a transcendental  subject with which those
conditions  are  supposed  to  lie.  Though  Fichte  seems  to  retain  some  notion  of  a
transcendental subject, a self-positing “I” that is knowable by a type of intuition, this
subject is not distinct from the self that is constrained by empirical law.12 Hegel also
rejects Kant’s separation of the subject from experience,13 and so does Schelling, each
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replacing the transcendental subject and the transcendental object with an “Absolute” in
which the subject and object become unified. However, Schelling and Hegel also suppose
(at least at certain stages) that the Absolute is knowable a priori by intellectual intuition.
Peirce’s early attack on such intellectual powers as intellectual intuition should be viewed
as his earliest distinctive break with the German Idealist tradition, as well as his first
significant commitment to some form of empiricism.
11 In the next section, I explain why Peirce draws the conclusion that there would be, with
enough time and experience, a final conclusion to all inquiry. There are several auxiliary
hypotheses  underlying  it,  ranging  from  the  belief-doubt  model  of  inquiry  to  the
hypothesis that natural laws are the result of evolutionary processes. In section three, I
give a limited defense of Peirce’s hypothesis of the Final Opinion. In section four, I explain
how  the  Final  Opinion  is  a  condition  for  the  possibility  of  knowledge  but  not  a
transcendental  constraint  on  it.  Here  I  invoke  Sacks’  (1997)  distinction  between
transcendental  constraints and  transcendental  features.  While  Peirce  is  not  a
transcendental philosopher in any rich sense, in the final section I explain how Peirce’s
metaphysics, particularly his hypothesis of the Final Opinion, is remarkably similar (to
varying degrees) to the Absolute of the Absolute Idealists – Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel –
despite their apriorism.
 
2. The Final Opinion as an Empirical Hypothesis
12 Upon what does Peirce base his hypothesis that there would be, with enough time and
experience, an ultimate conclusion that all inquirers would converge upon? As Daniel
Herbert nicely puts it, “Peirce maintains that there is sufficient empirical evidence to
support great confidence in the admittedly fallible hypothesis that the continuation of
any  given  inquiry  for  a  sufficient  period  of  time  would result  in  a  final  immovable
consensus of opinion between the participants in that inquiry” (Herbert, 2015: 111). But
exactly what, from experience, supports the theory that such a final consensus would
eventually be reached? Herbert cites a passage from Peirce’s 1885 review of Royce in
which Peirce argues that  a  final  opinion has already been reached on many specific
questions,  including  ones  that  were  previously  thought  unanswerable  (EP1:234).
However,  skeptics of  Peirce will  argue that the fact  that consensus has already been
reached on a number of questions does not imply that an unshakable consensus would be
reached on all meaningful questions.
13 It is well known that Peirce arrives at the analysis of truth as the Final Opinion, and at the
analysis of the real as the object of that opinion, by applying his rule for attaining the
third grade of clearness in our conceptions (i.e., the “pragmatic maxim”). It is also well
known that this rule tells us to consider the sensible effects the object of the concept
would have under different agential circumstances, as the wider function of concepts is to
guide the conduct of the agent who possesses it. As Peirce explains with respect to the
third grade analysis of the concept of force: 
The idea which the word force excites in our minds has no other function than to
affect our actions, and these actions can have no reference to force otherwise than
through its effects.  Consequently, if  we know what the effects of force are, we are
acquainted with every fact which is implied in saying that a force exists, and there
is nothing more to know. (W3:270, 1878)
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14 Later Peirce will find his 1878 formulation and applications of the rule for attaining the
third grade of clearness too nominalistic, and he will clarify that the object of a concept
consists  in  the  sensible  effects  the  object  (so  conceived)  would  have under  different
sensible and practical circumstances. The object of a concept is conceived modally as a set
or a system of habitual or dispositional properties, and not as a set of actual effects. What
any object is, including what any “abstract object” is, is a collection or system of habits
that are disposed to affect our experience and conduct. 
15 Applying Peirce’s pragmatic maxim to obtain an analysis of a concept involves broad
reflection  over  our  experience  and  knowledge,  or,  at  least,  over  any  experience  or
knowledge that we think might be relevant, even if indirectly, to the object of the concept
and to our conduct about it. It involves formulating an empirical analysis of the object of
the concept – specifically,  an analysis that describes the object in terms of habits or
dispositions to produce certain types of sensible effects under certain types of sensible
circumstances.14 While Peirce seems to identify the pragmatic analysis with the concept
itself – he says that “our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the
object” (CP 5.402, my emphasis) – that analysis is most precisely a representation of the
meaning of the concept. And, on Peirce’s view, symbols (concepts being mental symbols) are
meaningful only within a wider network of signs. No concept can be made very clear or
useful  to inquiry in isolation from many other concepts,  especially  concepts  directly
applicable to percepts.  Note that because the application of Peirce’s pragmatic maxim
results in an empirical analysis, it involves abduction. Also note that, while Peirce does not
deny that our concepts contain conventional elements,  so far as it’s interpreted with
pragmatic clarity,  a  concept is  subject  to revision in the course of  inquiry.  As many
scholars observe, on Peirce’s view, meaning and knowledge develop together.15
16 Thus, where Peirce comes to analyze truth as “the opinion which is fated to be ultimately
agreed to by all who investigate” and reality as what is “represented in this opinion,” he is
neither  defining a  new conventional  meaning nor  is  he  identifying a  transcendental
condition for truth or knowledge. He is offering an empirical hypothesis that clarifies the
concept of truth and the concept of reality. Truth is that representation which we would
tend towards holding in the long run of experience, and reality is the object of that
representation. Moreover, as Peirce explains later, reality itself draws us toward that Final
Opinion. 
17 But how does Peirce arrive at these specific hypotheses about truth and reality? 
18 In  “Some  Consequences  of  Four  Incapacities”  (1868;  henceforth Consequences ),  Peirce
suggests that the distinction between the real and the unreal first occurs to us as an
empirical  discovery,  when  we  discover  that  we  have  to  correct ourselves.  Thus,  the
concept of self-correction becomes tied to the concept of reality in its very inception: 
[W]hat do we mean by the real? It is a conception which we must first have had
when we discovered that there was an unreal, an illusion; that is, when we first
corrected ourselves. Now the distinction for which alone this fact logically called,
was between an ens relative to private inward determinations,  to the negations
belonging to idiosyncrasy, and an ens such as would stand in the long run. The real,
then, is that which, sooner or later, information and reasoning would finally result
in, and which is therefore independent of the vagaries of me and you. Thus, the
very  origin  of  the  conception  of  reality  shows  that  this  conception  essentially
involves  the notion of  a  COMMUNITY,  without  definite  limits,  and capable  of  a
definite increase of knowledge. And so those two series of cognition – the real and
the unreal – consist of those which, at a time sufficiently future, the community
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will always continue to re-affirm; and of those which, under the same conditions,
will ever after be denied. (CP 5.311)
19 Peirce claims that the fact that we sometimes have to correct ourselves “logically” calls
for a distinction between “an ens relative to private inward determinations” and “an ens
such as would stand in the long run” – i.e., between the unreal or the figment and the real
as  the  final  opinion.  Of  course,  how the  phenomenon  of  self-correction  calls  for  this
distinction in particular is not very transparent. Peirce’s claim depends on certain other
hypotheses developed in subsequent work.
20 One such other hypothesis is the well-known “belief-doubt theory of inquiry” that Peirce
develops in Fixation and in other works.16 It does not itself prescribe methods of inquiry. It
only  describes  the  general  psychological  mechanics  of  inquiry.  Surprise  or  failed
expectation causes doubt in some belief, and the “irritation” of that doubt compels us to
seek a belief that will satisfy that doubt – that is, until that belief gets disturbed by some
further surprise or failed expectation. In Fixation, Peirce calls the struggle to escape doubt
“inquiry,” and he regards inquiry generally as a self-corrective process. 17 An experience
causes doubt in some belief, and the uneasiness of that state compels us to establish a new
state of belief that puts the doubt to rest. 
21 Of course, self-correction and inquiry can come apart. With inquiry, the state of belief
that eases doubt can be the same belief that was disturbed by doubt, such as when one
experiences  momentary  doubt.  But  with  self-correction,  a  different  belief  must  be
established and ease doubt,  as  “self-correction” implies that  what was corrected was
wrong and that the correction is correct. Now, with respect to what standard can a belief
be correct or incorrect? Although it must introduce a normative dimension to inquiry,
this  standard needs  to  be  intrinsic  to  the descriptive  account.  That  is,  it  must  have
motivational force regardless of whether or not we intentionally adopt it, thus explaining
why we would be inclined to adopt it intentionally. The standard must be the main source
of our doubts. It must be external to our beliefs so that it can clash with them and cause
doubt. Thereby, it must be something real,  in the abstract sense of something that is
independent of any representation of it.
22 It is crucial to distinguish how Peirce’s normative claims are motivated by his descriptive
account.  The  belief-doubt  theory  does  not  itself  say  that  by  nature  we seek  (or  are
compelled to seek) beliefs that correspond with reality. It only says that we naturally seek
a state of belief that eases the irritation of doubt. But upon the further observation that
only by seeking to conform our beliefs with reality will we most expediently overcome
the threat  of  doubt,  the  claim that  we should seek to  conform our  beliefs  to  reality
acquires motivational force. As is well known, Peirce calls the method that seeks to have
our  beliefs  fixed  by  external  reality  “the  method  of  science”  (5.384/W3:27).  Other
methods have us fix belief  upon personal tenacity,  social  authority,  or upon thought
itself. While these methods might work in the short term, they will fail in the long run. 
23 The method of science will most expediently deliver us from doubt because of the laws
and mechanisms (or habits) through which reality affects our beliefs. Peirce thus adopts
this further empirical thesis that real things “affect our senses according to regular laws”
(ibid.). He conjectures:
[T]hough our sensations are as different as are our relations to the objects, yet, by
taking advantage of  the laws of  perception,  we can ascertain by reasoning how
things really and truly are; and any man, if he have sufficient experience and he
reason enough about it, will be led to the one True conclusion. (CP5.384/W3:27)
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24 The conjecture here is not just that real things affect our senses. It is that real things do
so in ways that bring our beliefs in conformity with them over time. Later in his writings,
Peirce even theorizes that there is a sort of attraction between reality and our minds that
takes place through our senses,  comparable to gravitational  attraction.18 He eventually
surmises that the mind itself, in virtue of its outstanding ability to form new habits,19 is a
self-correcting  system.  Although  in  the  short  term  a  variety  of  personal  and  social
influences  may  compel  us  to  hold  false  beliefs,  even  in the  face  of  glaring
counterevidence, in the long run those influences cannot withstand the overwhelming
pressure of realty. Peirce remarks that even the most pigheaded of men “who has sworn
by all the gods that he will never allow himself to believe the earth is round, and give him
time enough, and cram that time with experience in the pertinent sphere, and he will
surely come to and rest in the truth about the form of the earth” (7.78, c.1905). 20
25 Atkins (2017) points out that Peirce likely viewed the mind as a self-correcting system as
early as Questions and Consequences, where he argues that mental action generally is of the
nature of  a valid inference (W2:214).  If  Peirce is  correct there,  then the mind would
continuously self-correct and indefinitely approach the Final Opinion. But Atkins also
points out passages in 1906 and 1911 suggesting that Peirce came to believe that the Final
Opinion could only be reached or indefinitely approached if we adopt the right methods.21
In either  case,  the method of  science ought  to  be adopted,  if  only because it  would
shorten the time it takes to reach the Final Opinion, more so than other methods (which
might instead increase the time it would take, relative to the amount of time following no
method at all). 
26 The theory that anyone, with enough experience and reasoning, would eventually settle
upon the conclusion that conforms to reality, where reality would no longer threaten to
cause doubt, affords us our clearest notions of truth and reality – or so Peirce holds. The
crucial  point  is  that  he  seems  to  arrive  at  his  theory  upon  several  empirical
considerations: (1) that generally we are compelled to correct ourselves; (2) that self-
correction is  most successful  in the long run if  we seek to have our beliefs fixed by
external  reality;  (3)  that  there are laws of  perception through which we are able  to
conform our beliefs to reality; and (4) that despite our various cognitive biases, over the
long run, reality forces us,  via laws of perception and cognition, to believe correctly.
From these hypotheses he infers that the process of self-correction would indefinitely
improve: gradually there would be fewer and fewer “surprises” that would occasion a
need for self-correction.
 
3. Objections to Peirce’s Hypothesis of the Final
Opinion
27 All of the above empirical hypotheses, though I think they are plausible, are far from
being established facts.  In addition,  there are other questionable premises in Peirce’s
reasoning to the conclusion that self-correction would tend toward a single final result,
which concern why inquiry would not continue indefinitely in a linear fashion, or tend
toward several different results. As Legg (2014: 210) explains:
Even if inquiry produces convergence in belief, why should it be to one, single end-
state? That Peirce’s account by definition forbids what might be called pluralistic
convergence has been viewed as regrettably closed-minded. The charge has been
pursued  on  a  number  of  fronts:  Quine  in  terms  of  his  favoured  ontological
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relativity: “[…] we have no reason to suppose that man’s surface irritations even
unto eternity  admit  of  any  one  systematization  that  is  scientifically  better  or
simpler than all possible others” (Word and Object, 23), Hartry Field by imagining
alien predication (“Realism and Relativism,” 554), while Rorty presses the charge in
terms of human cultural sensitivity (Contingency Irony and Solidarity).
28 In  one  respect,  the  objection  of  “pluralistic  convergence”  may  be  based  on  a
misunderstanding of the Final Opinion and of Peirce’s theory of signs in general. It does
not matter what specific signs (or sign-vehicles) are used to represent real things. The
forms by which the signs are interpreted also do not matter so much. What matters is
that the signs and their interpretations allow the interpreters to anticipate and track real
objects  successfully,  such  that  no  further  experience  of  that  object  could  upset  the
interpretation or surprise the interpreter. While it seems impossible for two inconsistent
theories  to  represent  the  same reality  equally  well,  two  theories  can  do  so  in  such
different ways that they might appear inconsistent. 
29 It might seem that two genuinely inconsistent theories allow us to anticipate and track the
same object equally well. But Peirce would object that even if they each appear to do so in
the short term, differences will emerge in the long run (though, admittedly, the longer
they prove pragmatistically equivalent,  the greater reason we have to doubt Peirce’s
hypothesis). In another respect, pluralistic convergence might imply that reality itself is
pluralistic,  or  that  there  are  a  plurality  of  realities,  such that  these  realities  can be
inconsistent with one another. The hypothesis of plural and even inconsistent realities is
one that Peirce simply does not find supported by experience. As I will explain further on,
although he agrees that there is real plurality or variety, he also thinks that experience
shows that variety tends toward uniformity. 
30 Another objection is that, if there are an infinite number of realities to form beliefs about,
then there are potentially an infinite number of beliefs to form and of self-corrections to
take place. There might be a final result of inquiry on many specific questions; but if
reality is infinite then there could not be a final result of inquiry in general.22 Peirce seems
to assume that reality is not only a single system, but also a closed and finite system that
would, in the long run, affect all inquirers in the same way. What, we might ask, supports
this assumption? 
31 First, note that a final result of inquiry in general only requires that reality is finite in
distinct relations and qualities, and not in the number of individuals. There can be an
infinity of real objects if  those objects are qualitatively and relationally homogenous,
since  then  it  is  not  necessary  to  represent  each  one  individually:  one  only  has  to
represent the kind or type (by its qualities and relations) and that there are infinite
members of that kind or type.23 
32 However, this only hones in on the problem further. Why does Peirce assume that there is
not an infinity of real and distinct qualities and relations?
33 It is not clear that we find an explanation for this until 1887-88, in “A Guess at the Riddle”
(R  909/EP1:245-79),  in  which  Peirce  defends  the  metaphysical  theses  that  “law  is
developed out of pure chance, irregularity, and indeterminacy” and that the universe is
becoming more and more governed by laws. He argues that “we look back toward a point
in the infinitely distant past when there was no law but mere indeterminacy; we look
forward to a point in the infinitely distant future when there will be no indeterminacy or
chance but a complete reign of law.” (CP 1.409 / EP1:227). Peirce develops these ideas in
his subsequent 1891-1893 Monist series, the first of which, “The Architecture of Theories”
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(1891), conjectures that “the only possible way of accounting for the laws of nature and
for uniformity in general is to suppose them results of evolution” (CP 6.13 / EP1:288).24
While here Peirce might seem to make a transcendental argument, since he says the only
possible way to account for laws and uniformity is via some evolutionary process, he is
only  overstating  the  strength  of  the  evolutionary  explanation.  Peirce  thinks  that
experience shows us that some evolutionary process best explains natural laws. 
34 One empirical consideration that leads Peirce to the evolutionary hypothesis is that…
when we attempt to verify any physical law, we find our observations cannot be
precisely  satisfied  by  it,  and  rightly  attribute  the  discrepancy  to  errors  of
observation, so we must suppose far more minute discrepancies to exist owning to
the imperfect cogency of the law itself, to a certain swerving of the facts from any
definite formula. (W8:101, 1891)
35 Peirce’s prescience here is striking. As we now know, uncertainty is an inherent feature of
subatomic laws.25 He goes on to conjecture that biological and psychological laws also
develop through evolutionary processes.  At  some places,  he describes the process by
which things come to be governed by laws as itself a law-governed process – i.e., a process
governed by a  law that  he calls  the  law of  habit (e.g.  CP7.515).  Here again,  empirical
considerations are what primarily lead him to hypothesize that there is such a primordial
law. This is shown by an argument he makes earlier in the same essay: 
[E]very person who wishes to form an opinion concerning fundamental problems
should first of all make a complete survey of that human knowledge, should take
note of all the valuable ideas in each branch of science, should observe in just what
respect each has been successful and where it has failed, in order that, in the light
of  the  thorough  acquaintance  so  attained  of  the  available  materials  for  a
philosophical theory and of the nature and strength of each, he may proceed to the
study of  what  the problem of  philosophy consists  in,  and of  the proper way of
solving it. (CP6.9/W8:85)
36 We should suppose that Peirce followed his own recommendation here and drew much,
philosophically, from the different sciences. 
37 Whether or not it is well supported by empirical evidence, Peirce’s theory of the law of
habit, that the universe is becoming more ordered and governed by law, explains why he
would think that there is not an infinity of distinct qualities and relations, and that there
is not a plurality of realities that can be inconsistent with one another. As order and
lawfulness increases, variation decreases. Infinite variation is the opposite of order and
lawfulness. It is chaos. 
 
4. The Final Opinion as a Transcendental Feature of
Knowledge
38 One might argue that Peirce is not committed to every real thing being an object of the
Final Opinion. On the second grade of clearness, the real is conceived only as what is not
dependent on any representation about it.26 And Peirce does not believe that a concept is
meaningful only on the third grade of clearness, such that strictly first or second grade
apprehensions  of  a  concept  are,  separately  from  any  third  grade  apprehension,
completely vacuous.27 However, a mere first or second grade understanding of a concept
is  not  as  much  use  to  inquiry  as  is  a  third  grade  grasp  of  the  concept.  We  can
meaningfully  talk  about  reality  simply  as  that  which  does  not  depend  on  any
representation about it. But the concept of reality becomes particularly useful only when
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reality  is  conceived  as  dynamically  related  to  perception  and  conduct.  When  so
conceived, it is particularly and directly useful to the philosophical project of explaining
how knowledge is even possible. 
39 While  Peirce  denies  the  skeptical  assumption that  knowledge requires  some form of
absolute certainty, he belongs to the tradition that seeks to explain knowledge according
to some metaphysical  relation between the subject  and the object  of  knowledge –  a
tradition  that  includes  Kant  and  the  German  Idealists.  Peirce’s  theory  of  the  Final
Opinion, and all the hypotheses that support or enter into it, is his explanation for how
the subject and the object are metaphysically related (though in Peirce the subject is most
properly conceived as the indefinite community of inquirers). The relation is this: the subject
is necessarily determined to represent the object correctly in the indefinite long run, as a
result of the subject’s inherent ability to self-correct and the object’s inherent ability to
be represented by it.
40 This metaphysical explanation of the subject-object relation accounts very well for the
fallibility of all inquiry: progress toward the Final Opinion is a very long-term trend, so
that at any particular point inquirers can draw a false conclusion. But Peirce’s theory also
directly answers the question: upon what condition do we correctly represent the way
things really are? His  proposal  is  that  a  representation correctly represents  the way
things are when that representation would hold up over the long run of experience and
inquiry (though it may be disturbed by doubt at various points). Observe that this is an
external condition:  whether  a  given representation has  satisfied this  condition is  not
introspectively knowable, or knowable a priori, as the Cartesian or the Kantian conditions
for knowledge are supposed to be. It is not even clear that we would know that we have
reached the Final Opinion when we have actually reached it. Plausibly we would, since
whether we have reached the Final Opinion is itself a matter of fact or reality, and so
would be correctly represented in the Final Opinion itself.28
41 An influential strain of recent Peirce scholarship does not view the tendency toward the
Final  Opinion  as  a  metaphysical  connection  between  the  subject  and  the  object  of
knowledge. Works by Hookway (2000, 2012), Misak (1991, 2007), Howat (2013, 2014), Legg
(2014),  and Atkin (2015)  focus on Peirce’s  notion of  the Final  Opinion as  a regulative
assumption or an intellectual hope – which it certainly is – however, upon this strain, Peirce
is not committed to the truth of the claim that there would be a final result of inquiry with
enough time and experience, as he only thinks that we need to assume or hope that there
would be such a final result, either in order to motivate inquiry or to make sense of it as a
rational endeavor (or both). Passages such as the following are cited as evidence for this
interpretation. Peirce writes to Lady Welby: “I do not say that it is infallibly true that
there is any belief to which a person would come if he were to carry his inquiries far
enough. I only say that that alone is what I call Truth” (SS 73, 1908). However, in this
passage,  Peirce  is  only  expressing  the  fallibility  of  his  theory  of  truth.  It  is  fallible
particularly because it is an empirical hypothesis. Although the hypothesis might not be
best characterized as a belief,29 Peirce endorses it so far as he thinks it is acceptable to
endorse any metaphysical hypothesis.
42 Peirce is not committed to the claim that there will be a Final Opinion. He acknowledges
that all life could end long before it would be reached (e.g. CP 8.43, 1885). But he is as
committed to the claim that there would be a final result of inquiry as he is to any other
proposition in his philosophy. As a fallibilist and empiricist, he does not commit to any
philosophical  claim as  anything more  than a  reasonable  hypothesis  that’s  subject  to
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further inquiry. But the Final Opinion is a hypothesis to which he is fully committed as
our most reasonable explanation for knowledge. Any attempt to portray Peirce’s theory
of truth as something other than a metaphysical theory would be, by his own lights, to
make him out as a sort of nominalist. Although he is a strong empiricist, Peirce does not
shy away from metaphysics, or from metaphysical theories of truth.30 
43 Sometimes attending interpretations of the Final Opinion as a regulative assumption or
intellectual hope is the identification of a type of transcendental argument or element in
Peirce. The idea is that the regulative assumption or hope that all inquiry will converge
on a final opinion is a necessary condition for any inquiry – albeit a necessary motivating
condition that does not entail that the assumption or the hope is true. As Atkin (2015:
453) says, “the indispensability of some assumption for a practice proves nothing about
the truth of that assumption.” But it can be viewed as a transcendental element in the
sense that the hope in or assumption of a final opinion is an indispensable condition for
inquiry. Cooke (2005) goes further by arguing that this hope is not only a necessary
motivational condition, but a necessary constitutive condition: what it means to inquire is,
in part, to hope for an answer, even if one does not have sufficient evidence that an
answer will be reached.
44 My  approach  recognizes  a  transcendental  element  in  Peirce’s  account  of  truth  and
inquiry  and,  seemingly  in  contrast  to  the  Misak-Hookway  line  of  interpretation,  an
element that involves a commitment (albeit tentative) to the truth that there would be a
Final Opinion with sufficient experience. But this transcendental element is not knowable
a priori. It is only a transcendental feature of knowledge, as opposed to a transcendental
constraint on knowledge. Sacks (1997) makes this distinction upon reflection on the later
Wittgenstein,  and he argues that Wittgenstein’s  notion of  “language games” serve as
transcendental features in his philosophy: 
Roughly,  a  transcendental  constraint  indicates  a  dependence  of  empirical
possibilities on a non-empirical structure, say, the structure of anything that can
count as a mind. Such constraints will determine non-empirical limits of possible
forms of experience. […] A merely transcendental feature, on the other hand, is
significantly weaker. Transcendental features indicate the limitations on what, at a
time,  can  be  envisaged  as  possible,  and  to  which  alternatives  cannot  be  made
intelligible as long as they retain their transcendental status. Given this reversed
direction of determination it  follows that while transcendental  features indicate
limitations  on  what  can  be  envisaged,  those  limitations,  in  so  far  as  they  are
determined by no more than empirical facts, can themselves change over time, and
moreover can change in a way that is not subject to any constraints whatsoever. A
transcendental  feature  is,  to  speak  metaphorically,  no  more  than  a  shadow  of
necessity cast by whatever practices are current. (Sacks, 1997: 178)
45 While  a  transcendental  constraint  is  transcendent  of  all  possible  experience  and
determines  the  forms  or  limitations  of  experience,  a  transcendental  feature is  an
empirical constraint on what is possible: it expresses only what we can currently envisage
as possible. It does not transcend all possible experience, but is rather what we come to
see as possible given our experience. It is “transcendental” only in the sense that it is the
general structure to which any experience is currently expected to conform. But since we
expect that future experience will conform to this general structure as a result of past
experience, we have no basis on which to declare it impossible for any future experience
to fail to conform to it. 
46 Peirce’s theory of the Final Opinion (and the theories of cognition, inquiry, and natural
laws that surround it) specifies the primary empirical constraint on knowledge, or the
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primary transcendental feature of knowledge, as it  describes a general structure that
knowledge  is  reasonably  expected  to  take.  The  use  of  “transcendental”  here  seems
broadly consistent with Gava’s (2014), where X is transcendental if X is necessary to some
Y; or X is essential to Y. It is necessary to knowing that P that P would be accepted as part
of the Final Opinion. But the metaphysical necessity here cannot be known a priori. Gava
is  correct  that,  in  Peirce,  we  abstract  “fundamental  relational  structures”  from
experience. But he does not adequately explain how Peirce accounts for our knowledge of
these  structures  independently  of  experience.  Prescission  and  abstraction  from
experience are types of inferences from experience (CP 4.463); and if those inferences
from experience are the only grounds upon which we can know the inferred object, then
our knowledge of that object depends on experience.
 
5. Absolute Idealism and Intellectual Intuition
47 So while there is indeed some similarity between Peirce’s philosophy and transcendental
idealism, it would be incorrect to assume that there are a priori elements to the former.
There is a closer affinity between Peirce’s philosophy and absolute idealism.31 Peirce could
even be  said  to  “empiricize”  absolute  idealism.  One  might  also  argue  that,  shortly
following  the  publication  of  Kant’s  first  Critique,  German  philosophy  began  shifting
toward what may be described as a type of empirical method: phenomenology. And while
phenomenology is better known as a method or style first employed by Hegel, it was
arguably first employed by Fichte. Unfortunately, Fichte along with Schelling and Hegel
still err in thinking that their conclusions are safe from on-going revelations of sense
experience.
48 Fichte describes the conditions of experience in terms of the structure that presents itself
qua a form of  self-consciousness that he calls  “intellectual intuition.” He claims that
experience is structured most fundamentally by an “ego” and a “non-ego”, or an “other,”
where  the  ego  continually  engages  in  self-conscious  activity  and  conscious  activity
toward a non-ego, and where a synthesis occurs between the two activities – what he
describes as a “reciprocal causality” (Fichte, 1994: 281). This reciprocal causality appears
to comprise a dynamical and teleological process. While the ego is finite and limited in its
freedom with relation to the non-ego, the ego posits itself as an “absolute ego” – an
unlimited ego or an ego of unlimited freedom. The ego strives to realize this unlimited or
absolute freedom through its transactions with the non-ego, but it can ever only approach
this absolute freedom. Fichte remarks that “man is to draw infinitely nearer to the in
itself unattainable freedom” (ibid.: 92). Such absolute freedom is unattainable, according
to him, as the absolute ego is only an idea or ideal – albeit one that is fundamental to the
ego, more fundamental, it seems, than representation. As Adamson remarks, for Fichte
“the essence of a conscious being is not representation or knowledge, but activity or
freedom,” although this activity incorporates representation or knowledge (Adamson,
1881: 179). The activity is directed upon an ideal, the limitless or absolute ego, forming an
“infinite tendency” toward an “unattainable freedom.”
49 Peirce mentions Fichte at few places,32 though not with much affection. At one place he
criticizes Fichte’s system as an “idealistic nominalism” (CP4.551, 1905), the reasons for
which I  will  not  investigate  here.  But  that  accusation notwithstanding,  the  parallels
between Fichte’s and Peirce’s systems are quite direct and significant, whether or not
Peirce intentionally drew from Fichte or acknowledges these parallels.  Not only does
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Fichte’s “Absolute Ego” seem to correspond to Peirce’s Final Opinion as an ideal toward
which our practical activity (or at least our scientific activity) is directed and would draw
closer to over time,33 they correspond in each being an ultimate condition or explanation
for  knowledge  in  the  respective  author’s  system.  Furthermore,  Peirce’s  analysis  of
experience  is  very  similar  to  Fichte’s.  Peirce  describes  experience  as  a  “two-sided
consciousness of an ego and non-ego” (8.330, 1904), where the non-ego resists and reacts
against the ego (8.266, 1903) in a sense not unlike the one we find in Fichte. The ego is
Firstness (freedom,  spontaneity)  while  the  non-ego  introduces  Secondness into  our
experience (Brute resistance, reaction). And their interactions with each other introduces
Thirdness, a lawfulness by which our experience develops toward a certain end. 
50 However,  Fichte  assumes  a  certain  capacity  of  which  Peirce  is  highly  skeptical  –  a
capacity for “intellectual  intuition,” which seems closest  to what,  in Questions,  Peirce
criticizes  as  “intuitive  self-consciousness.”  Peirce  does  not  deny  that  we  are  self-
conscious, or that we have knowledge of the self. But he denies that this self-conscious
knowledge is intuitive – i.e., not inferred or arising from other cognitions. But so far as
this intuition is phenomenological and does not establish any a priori knowledge, there’s
little difference between Fichte and Peirce in how they arrive at the conclusion that
experience involves an interaction between an ego and a non-ego. It is well known that
Peirce  himself  engages  in  phenomenological  reflection  in  his  phaneroscopic
investigations of fundamental categories. He also seems to engage in phenomenological
reflection in his description of experience as a clash between an ego and non-ego (to
which  he  also  comes  through  psychological  theory,  or  reasoning  from  experience).
Unfortunately,  Fichte  seems committed to  an a  priori  knowledge  of  the  ego and its
activity. While Fichte says that intellectual intuition of the ego cannot be separated from
sensible intuition of the non-ego within experience,34 he insists that intellectual intuition
is  a  source  of  knowledge  that  is  independent  of  sense  experience,  arguing  that
“intellectual  intuition provides the only firm standpoint  for any philosophy” (Fichte,
1994: 49-50).  Yet,  one might defend Fichtean intellectual intuition as little more than
“reflection” or “introspection,” which empiricists such as Locke (1689) have upheld as a
type of experience. 
51 Schelling’s metaphysics also casts reality in a dynamic and teleological form, and also
bears resemblance to Peirce’s own dynamic and teleological semeiotic and metaphysics.
Schelling  treats  nature  as  mind-like  or  purposive,  developing  from  an  unconscious
materiality,  to  organic  forms,  to  conscious  beings  organized  socially,  to  an  Absolute
consciousness in which, in his Identitätphilosophie, the subject and object of knowledge are
identical. One correspondence between Peirce and Schelling that particularly stands out
is between Peirce’s “objective idealism” – the thesis that “matter is effete mind” and
Schelling’s view that “the laws of mind materialize into the laws of nature, or the formal
annexes the material” (1978/1800: 14). Peirce acknowledges this correspondence between
his and Schelling’s philosophy:
I  have  begun  by  showing  that  tychism  must  give  birth  to  an  evolutionary
cosmology,  in  which all  the regularities  of  nature and of mind are  regarded as
products of growth, and to a Schelling-fashioned idealism which holds matter to be
mere specialized and partially deadened mind. (6.102, 1892)
52 While  Peirce  does  not  share Schelling’s  seemingly  monistic  view of  the Absolute,  he
shares, at least in the 1891-93 Monist series, Schelling’s attempt to subsume the material
world into a world of purpose and representation. Commentators have taken particular
notice of this. Dea (2015a) argues that Peirce’s idealism falls in the absolutist camp, as
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opposed  to  James’s  pluralistic  version  of  idealism,  mostly  due  to  Peirce’s  objective
idealism.  And  Dilworth  points  out  that  Peirce’s  idealism  is  Schellingian  particularly
because Peirce “forged a theoretical explanation of how mind turns into matter, not how,
in a chance world, matter turns into mind” (Dilworth, 2016: 262). 
53 But a significant strain of apriorism seems more evident in Schelling than in Fichte. On
Schelling’s  account,  knowledge of  the  Absolute,  or  of  the  mental  and developmental
structure  of  reality,  comes  strictly by  means  of  intellectual  intuition.  Sharply
distinguishing  intellectual  intuition  from  sensible  intuition,  Schelling  declares  that
“Intellectual intuition is the organ of all transcendental thinking” (1978: 27). Intellectual
intuition has  the  Self  or  the  subjective  as  its  object,  and from that  intuition of  the
subjective conditions of experience we can arrive at a priori knowledge of the Absolute.
Schelling also seems to identify intellectual intuition with the Self itself, making itself
unconditioned by any previous cognition (ibid.).  It  is precisely this sort of intuition –
immediate cognition of the self not determined by any previous cognition – that Peirce
rejects in both Questions and Consequences. 
54 I will not comment much on the affinities between Peirce and Hegel, as these are better
known and as many of the same general points concerning Fichte and Schelling apply to
Hegel. While Peirce agrees with Hegel that reality has a rational, purposive, or quasi-
mental structure, which develops towards something like an “Absolute,” Peirce does not
think, as Hegel appears to, that any of this can be known a priori.  Recall that Peirce
accuses Hegel in particular of following the a priori method, which is tied to another well-
known criticism, that Hegel denies the reality of the first two categories, in particular
Secondness. In his 1885 review of Royce, Peirce famously complains of Hegel: “The capital
error of Hegel which permeates his whole system in every part of it is that he almost
altogether ignores the Outward Clash” (CP 8.41). By the “outward clash” Peirce means the
confrontation with external reality that we experience through sense perception.
55 But Peirce agrees with Hegel and Schelling,  against Kant,  that the conditions for the
possibility of empirical knowledge do not lie with a subject understood as distinct from
the object-in-itself.  Instead, they lie with a dynamical,  teleological union between the
subject and the object. Yet, while there are clear parallels between the Absolute of the
German Idealists and Peirce’s Final Opinion (or Final Interpretant), the German Absolute
is  a  transcendental  constraint knowable  a  priori,  while  the  Final  Opinion  or  Final
Interpretant is only a transcendental feature. The Final Opinion explains the objectivity of
our experience. But it is also a hypothesis or an abduction from experience. There are no
special  abilities,  like  “intellectual  intuition,”  by  which  we  can  know  a  priori  that
experience and inquiry would eventually result in a fixed and final conclusion about the
world, or in a fixed and final interpretation of any given sign. Moreover, in Peirce, unlike
in Hegel  and in Schelling,  the teleological  process through the subject  and object  of
knowledge are necessarily related is not be understood as an entirely mental or rational
process.  Peirce  is  clear  that  external  reality,  and our  experience  of  external  reality,
involves a brute or non-rational element, and that this non-rational (and non-mental)
element also drives the process leading toward the Final Opinion. 
56 Apel is correct that Peirce’s philosophy involves a sort of synthesis of English and German
philosophies (Appel, 1981: 20).  Peirce purges nominalism from British empiricism and
Scottish  common-sensism,  and  combines  empiricism  and  common-sensism  with
metaphysical theories that reflect those Hegel and Schelling more than they do those of
Locke, Hume, or Reid. From a different angle, one can say that Peirce purges apriorism
Peirce’s Hypothesis of the Final Opinion
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, X-2 | 2018
14
from  German  Idealism  and  combines  it  with  epistemological  and  methodological
principles that are more similar to those of Locke, Hume or Reid than to those of Kant,
Schelling, or Hegel. The result is a system that might repulse proponents of both camps,
but might nonetheless itself be a significant advancement toward that Final Opinion.
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NOTES
1. See Wilson (2016: 219-23).
2. In the full  passage,  Peirce explains that pragmaticism and Hegel’s  absolute idealism come
apart with the pragmaticist’s “vigorous denial that the third category (which Hegel degrades to a
mere  stage  of  thinking)  suffices  to  make  the  world,  or  is  even  so  much  as  self-sufficient”
(CP5.436, 1904).
3. Wilson 2012, 2017.
4. As Peirce says,  “metaphysics,  even bad metaphysics,  really rests on observations,  whether
consciously or not; and the only reason that this is not universally recognized is that it rests
upon kinds of phenomena with which every man’s experience is so saturated that ususally pays
no particular attention to them” (CP6.2, 1898). 
5. See CP7.579, 1867; CP8.37, 1871; CP7.485 1898; CP2.203, 1901; and CP1.129, 1905.
6. I use “empirical knowledge” to include perceptual knowledge, or proposition represented via a
strictly  perceptual  process,  indexed  directly  to  percepts,  and  theories  that  are  supported
inferentially upon perceptual knowledge.
7. The best  discussion I  have seen concerning whether  Peirce  defends induction on a  priori
grounds is in Skagestad 1981.
8. For instance, Westphal 2003 and Cooke 2005.
9. Resistance to the a priori mode of thinking is, fundamentally for Peirce, resistance to a way of
blocking  inquiry  and  a  commitment  to  fallibilism.  While  apriorists  can  be  fallibilists,  their
commitment to fallibilism cannot go much further than a recognition that their claims could be
in error. The infallibilist element of the a priori method is that it takes its a priori claims to be
immune from doubt triggered by perception or what we can infer from perception.
10. In  Questions,  Peirce  claims:  “all  our  conceptions  are  obtained  by  abstractions  and
combinations of cognitions first occurring in judgments of experience” (W2:208, 1868).
11. Herbert 2015 makes arguments against claims that Peirce’s universal categories (Firstness,
Secondness,  and  Thirdness.  In  Wilson  2016,  I  argue  that  Peirce  defends  the reality  of  the
categories based primarily on his logic and semeiotic, which he conceives as empirical inquiries
(288-9). 
12. One  could  read  Fichte  as  a  type  of  empiricist,  so  far  as  he  declares  that  “all  being  is
necessarily sensible being” (472/225).
13. On this point about Hegel, see Giladi 2014.
14. While some of these habits or dispositions might be conceived as intrinsic to the object and,
therefore, central to the concept, others might be conceived as extrinsic or obtaining only in
relation to a wider system. But any habit attributed to the object must have some ability to affect
and be represented through sense perception and conduct, in order to add our grasp and use of
the concept. 
15. For instance, Haack 2009 and Dea 2015b
16. For instance, the 1903 Harvard Lectures; in particular, see CP5.50-51/EP2:153-4.
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17. Peirce describes science, common-sense, reasoning, and inquiry as subject to a process of
self-correction, remarking that “inquiry of every type, fully carried out, has the vital power of
self-correction and growth” (CP 5.583).
18. Peirce does so at least at two places: (1) “There is, then, to every question a true answer, a
final conclusion, to which the opinion of every man is constantly gravitating. He may for a time
recede from it,  but give him more experience and time for consideration, and he will  finally
approach it” (CP 8.12, 1871). (2) “There is nothing extraordinary therefore in saying that the
existence of external realities depends upon the fact, that opinion will finally settle in the belief
in them. And yet that these realities existed before the belief took rise, and were even the cause
of that belief , just as the force of gravity is the cause of the falling of the inkstand – although the
force of gravity consists merely in the fact that the inkstand and other objects will fall” (CP 7.344,
1873).
19. See, for instance, CP 7.367 and CP 7.515.
20. More fully, Peirce writes: “Sooner or later [science] will attain the truth, nothing more. It
means that if you take the most pigheaded and passionate of men who has sworn by all the gods
that he will never allow himself to believe the earth is round, and give him time enough, and
cram that time with experience in the pertinent sphere, and he will surely come to and rest in
the truth about the form of the earth” (CP7.78, c.1905).
21. The passages are as follows: “if we can ﬁnd out the right method of thinking and can follow it
out, – the right method of transforming signs, – then truth can be nothing more nor less than the
last result to which the following out of this method would ultimately carry us” (EP2:380). In
1911, he states, “I call[ed] ‘truth’ the predestinate opinion, by which I ought to have meant that
which would ultimately prevail if investigation were carried sufﬁciently far in that particular
direction” (EP2:457).
22. Peirce himself suggests that, even if a certain question would eventually be answered, several
new questions may arise with each question that does get answered. In that case, it seems, we
would never so much as even approach a final  result  of  all  inquiry.  Peirce recognizes this  a
genuine possibility, but he does not believe that we have as much reason to accept this possibility
as  we  do  the  alternative.  He  argues:  “The  problem  whether  a  given  question  will  ever  get
answered or not is not so simple; the number of questions asked is constantly increasing, and the
capacity for answering them is also on the increase. If the rate of the latter increase is greater
than that  of  the [former]  the probability  is  unity  that  any given question will  be  answered;
otherwise the probability is zero. Considerations too long to be explained here lead me to think
that  the  former  state  of  things  is  the  actual one.  In  that  case,  there  is  but  an  infinitesimal
proportion  of  questions  which  do  not  get  answered,  although  the  multitude  of  unanswered
questions is forever on the increase” (8.43, 1885). Also see CP5.409 and EP2:457.
23. For example, “there exists three apples” represents precisely the same facts as “there exists
an apple,  there exists  a  second apple,  and there exists a  third apple” so long as the ordinal
number is arbitrarily assigned and does not represent a particular position or relation among the
individual members. 
24. Elsewhere Peirce characterizes the movement “from difformity to uniformity” as the “law of
habit” (6.101, 1902).
25. For  more  on  the  connections  between  Peirce’s  metaphysical  hypotheses  and  quantum
physics, see, for instance, Hartshorne 1973.
26. As Peirce puts it in “How to Make Our Ideas Clear,” the real is “that whose characters are
independent of what anybody may think them to be” (CP5.405/W3:271).
27. Originally, Peirce may have thought that the third grade analysis of a concept is the only
genuine expression of a concept. But even if he had, he later gave that notion up. As he remarks
to Paul Carus in 1903: “I ought to say that my three grades of clearness are not, as I seemed then
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to think, such that either the first or the second are superseded by the third, although we may
say that they are acquired, mostly, in the order of those numbers” (CP8.218).
28. See Wilson (2016: 256-7).  We might also worry about an infinite regression of knowledge
claims: S knows that X, S knows that she knows X, S knows that she knows that she knows X, ad
infinitum.
29. Peirce famously denies that belief has any place in science in the first of his 1898 Cambridge
Conference lectures: “what is properly and usually called belief […] has no place in science at all”
(CP1.635/RLT 112). For enlightening analysis of this claim, see Migotti 2005 and Atkins 2016. 
30. Haack nicely explains how Peirce’s approach to metaphysics is empirical and distinct from
Kant’s: “Kant assumes that metaphysics is distinguished from physics precisely by virtue of ‘lying
beyond experience’ (PM, p. 15). Metaphysics will be an a priori investigation of the conditions of
the possibility of human knowledge; and thus will stand ‘wholly isolated’ (PM, p. 11). But Peirce’s
scientific  metaphysics  will  be an a posteriori  discipline,  and anything but isolated.  It  will  be
continuous with the special sciences; but it is charged with investigating those aspects of reality
too general to fall within their scope[.]” (Haack, 2007: 33).
31. Some might prefer “objective idealism” as the contrast to “transcendental idealism” within
the German tradition. But a notion of an absolute or “unconditioned” plays a vital role in each
Fichte’s, Schelling’s, and Hegel’s philosophies, and those are the notions I find most similar to
Peirce’s notion of the Final Opinion.
32. At  least  among  Peirce’s  works  published  in  the  Collected  Papers;  I  have  not  sufficiently
searched for references to Fichte in works not published in that collection.
33. Two  comments:  First,  whether  the  Final  Opinion,  like  Fichte’s  Absolute  Ego,  is  an
unattainable ideal is subject to interpretative dispute. On my reading, the Final Opinion is not
unattainable. Perhaps the reason Peirce calls Fichte an idealistic nominalistic is precisely because
Fichte sees the Absolute as  unattainable.  Second,  the Fichtean Absolute Ego may correspond
more precisely to the Peircean Summum Bonum, or the ultimate end of all action, is tied up with
the Final Opinion, but is not it’s a representation (or not necessarily a representation). Fichte’s
Absolute  Ego  is  a  state  of  absolute freedom,  and  that  would  more  closely  parallel  Peirce’s
Summum Bonum than his Final Opinion.
34. In Introductions to the Wissenschaftslehre, Fichte (1994: 47) writes that “intellectual intuition is
always conjoined with some sensory intuition.”
ABSTRACTS
Idealist  and Strong Empiricist  approaches  to  Peirce’s  thought  are  irreconcilable  so  far  as  an
Idealist interpretation commits Peirce to some form of a priori knowledge, particularly a priori
knowledge  of  the  conditions  of  empirical  knowledge.  However,  while  I  favor  the  strong
empiricist  approach,  I  agree  that  there  is  something  like  a  “condition  for  the  possibility  of
empirical knowledge” in Peirce, and that this lies with his famous conjecture that, with enough
time and experience, there would be a “final result” of all inquiry – “the Final Opinion.” Though
some argue that this is mainly a regulative assumption or intellectual hope in Peirce, I contend
that he is committed to it as an empirical hypothesis which we should provisionally accept. As an
empirical  hypothesis,  it  is  not  a  transcendental  constraint  on  knowledge,  though  it  can  be
considered  a  transcendental feature (following  Sacks’  (1997)  distinction).  That  is,  the  thesis
explains how knowledge is possible, but the epistemic status of the thesis itself is dependent on
Peirce’s Hypothesis of the Final Opinion
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, X-2 | 2018
19
the course of experience. Here I explain how it is an empirical thesis and I explain the empirical
considerations Peirce thinks support it. Though Peirce should not be considered a transcendental
idealist in any robust sense, I give reasons for why he could still be considered a sort of absolute
idealist. 
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